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Limits of Policy Intervention in a 
World of Neoliberal Mechanism 
Designs: Paradoxes of the Global 
Crisis 
 
Summary: The current global context poses several paradoxes: the recovery
from the 2009 recession was not a recovery; investment, normally driven by
profit rates, is lagging and not leading economic activity; the crisis is global but 
debate involves sub-global levels; and public safety-nets, which have helped to 
stabilize national income, are being cut. These paradoxes can be traced, in
part, to the impact of the “truce” that followed the Keynesian-Monetarist contro-
versy on economists’ ideas about policy activism. This implicit “truce” has re-
moved activist macro policy from discussion, and shifted attention toward insti-
tutions as mechanisms for solving game-theoretic coordination problems. Poli-
cy activism then centers on how the “agents” (nations) can achieve optimal use
of their available resources (or optimal access to resources) at the global level;
and this involves creating and fine-tuning compacts – neoliberal mechanism 
designs – that can capture rents and attract globally mobile capital. This ap-
proach leads economists to see the key problem in the current global crisis as
fixing broken neoliberal mechanisms. However, a global economy dominated
by mechanisms that feed on aggregate demand without generating it faces the 
prospect of stagnation or collapse.
Key words: Neoliberal mechanism design, Policy activism, Keynesian-
Monetarist controversy, Globalization, Capital mobility, Hyman Minsky, Brad-
ford De Long. 
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“On one side, the re-emergence of powers such as China and India is creating 
a more competitive, multipolar system. These rising nations, understandably, 
want to assert their own interests after two centuries of western hegemony. On 
the other side, the fact of closer interdependence deprives even the US of the 
capacity to act both effectively and independently.” 
 
“The result is a contest between the centrifugal impulse inherent in a multi-
polar system, and the centripetal force of interdependence.” 
   
Philip Stephens (2009). 
 
The current global context poses several paradoxes. First, the recovery from the deep 
2009 recession was not a recovery. Massive fiscal-policy and financial-system inter-
ventions restored positive (if weak) GDP growth and rescued profits; but less a year 
into recovery, growth has slowed in the US, the UK, and the Eurozone, and employ-
ment problems are deepening. Figure 1 demonstrates this paradox for the US econ-
omy: profits recovered fully after 2009 while real growth turned downward.  
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Second, since profit rates were restored, and profitability normally drives in-
vestment spending, robust investment should have followed the public-sector inter-
ventions and spurred recovery. But post-crisis, investment spending never recovered. 
Figure 2 shows that three US net-investment indices are all below 2005 levels. 
Whether depressed real-estate markets, high private-sector liquidity preference, or 
weak consumer demand is to blame, sluggish investment is dragging down growth, 
not leading it.  
Third, the current situation is a global growth crisis, on the scale of the 1970s 
or even 1930s; but meaningful debates about “what is to be done” are occurring at 
sub-global levels. Efforts to coordinate tighter bank regulations in the UK, US, and 
Eurozone have come to nothing, as have efforts to revive the Doha Round of multi-
lateral trade agreements and post-crisis G-20 meetings. Fourth, government policies 
that most neutralized the impacts of crisis in 2009 were pre-neoliberal “safety net” 
and family-support policies, notably in global North countries (France and Germany) 
formerly termed “Euro-sclerotic.” But as recession beckons anew in the global 
North, politicians talk only about further safety-net cuts. Only global-South nations 
are making advances in family and worker support.  
Taken together, these paradoxes are combining to push global North econo-
mies, if not the world as a whole, toward renewed stagnation or worse. This essay 
argues that these paradoxes and the anemic response to the recent disaster-scenario 
can be traced, in part, to the peculiar evolution of economists’ ideas about policy ac-
tivism in the Neoliberal era. The decades-old Keynesian-Monetarist controversy was 
succeeded by a forced “truce.” Under this truce, macro policy was reimagined as a 
sort of laser surgery: precise, centering on calibrated targets, and largely invisible. 
For the first two decades of this era, the global macroeconomy played along, serving 
up a “Great Moderation” from which extreme events and shifts were apparently ban-
ished (at least in the global North). 
But something went terribly wrong. Wrenching shocks rooted in financial dys-
function did not become an impossibility just because economists could no longer 
could imagine that they might happen. But while we remain in Hyman Minsky’s 
world, we no longer have access to Minsky’s solutions: the global economy is no 
longer dominated by large macroeconomies with the capacity and will to intervene as 
necessary to stabilize prices and national income levels.  
We are instead in a global neoliberal order dominated by the free flow – or the 
threat or promise of the free flow – of capital across borders. In this order, govern-
mental powers have been devoted to deregulation and to the creation and mainte-
nance of supra-national compacts. These compacts reflect mechanism design solu-
tions to the conditions of the neoliberal world. As such, they have compromised na-
tions’ capacities to freely manage macroeconomic policy, in favor of rules that ac-
quiesce to the core prerogatives of the neoliberal era – the freedom of action of capi-
tal and finance. The most elaborate of the neoliberal mechanisms, the Eurozone, re-
quires their member governments to reinforce the integrity of the zone’s suprana-
tional fiscal discipline. This is interpreted as sending reassuring signals to mobile 
global capital and facilitating trade-led growth.   
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So strong is the pull of these mechanisms that even countries not bound by 
such pacts are inventing self-imposed limits on their freedom of policy movement. 
Consequently, even faced with global depression, national leaders either are unable 
or unwilling to use crisis-resolution tools that have worked successfully in past mac-
roeconomic downturns. This hesitation is encouraged by New Classical economists’ 
denial that government policy was ever effective in such circumstances. The result is 
an erasure of policy memory, precisely when the lessons of 1930s and 1950s Keynes-
ian policy are needed most.  
 
1. Following Brad De Long through the Looking Glass and Back 
 
Understanding what has gone wrong in economic-policy thinking can be approached 
by dissecting Bradford J. De Long’s recent statement that economics – that is, 
highly-ranked US departments of economics – needs another Minsky. This UC 
Berkeley economist is among the small group of prominent mainstream economists 
who has traced the dramatic subprime-securities-fueled plunge of US economic 
growth, in part, to the hermetic, inward-looking character of most contemporary eco-
nomic theory. Of central interest for our purpose is both what De Long sees, and 
what he does not see. 
Most famously, Paul Krugman’s 2009 New York Times Magazine article de-
cried the domination of contemporary macroeconomics by real-business-cycle, full-
optimization models, with policy implications that pertain to equilibrium worlds in-
stead of the world we live in. He also acknowledged that the New Keynesian eco-
nomics that arose in response to these models had become “Panglossian,” in large 
part because they were committed to an efficient-market view of financial markets 
that precluded bubbles (and hence the current crisis, in his view). He argued that “a 
more or less Keynesian” approach to macroeconomics, and argued for renewed atten-
tion to credit market models that leave room for “dysfunctional finance,” along lines 
pioneered by Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1989), Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John 
Moore (1997), and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1997). Krugman’s article 
drew a ferocious response from John Cochrane (2009). Delong’s 2010 critique went 
deeper than did Krugman in his critique of economic theory per se:  
 
 “One of the dirty secrets of economics is that there is no such thing as ‘economic the-
ory.’ There is simply no set of bedrock principles on which one can base calculations 
that illuminate real-world economic outcomes. We should bear in mind this constraint 
on economic knowledge as the global drive for fiscal austerity shifts into top gear. 
Unlike economists, biologists, for example, know that every cell functions according to 
instructions for protein synthesis encoded in its DNA. … Physicists start with the four 
fundamental forces of nature. 
Economists have none of that. The ‘economic principles’ underpinning their theories 
are a fraud – not fundamental truths but mere knobs that are twiddled and tuned so 
that the ‘right’ conclusions come out of the analysis.” 
 
De Long went on to argue that one set of economists uses their prior political 
beliefs to “twaddle and tune” until conclusions are reached that please their political 
allies, while the other type “takes the carcass of history, throws it into the pot, turns 
up the heat, and boils it down, hoping that the bones will yield lessons and suggest  
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principles to guide our civilization’s voters, bureaucrats, and politicians as they 
slouch toward utopia.” Clearly, De Long sees himself in the second camp – a propo-
nent of economic history against economic theory. However, this iconoclastic thinker 
shifts his perspective subtly in his 2011 essay, “The Crisis of Economics”:  
 
“The fact is that we need fewer efficient markets theorists and more people who work 
on microstructure, limits to arbitrage, and cognitive biases. We need fewer equilib-
rium business-cycle theorists and more old-fashioned Keynesians and monetarists. We 
need more monetary historians and historians of economic thought and fewer model-
builders. We need more Eichengreens, Shillers, Akerlofs, Reinharts, and Rogoffs—not 
to mention a Kindleberger, Minsky, or Bagehot.” (De Long 2011, p. 2). 
 
De Long here advocates “old-fashioned” macroeconomics, “work on micro-
structure” along the lines that Krugman suggested, and even another Minsky. But 
will this cri de coeur be answered? Economics needs another economist who, like 
Minsky, can describe the latent chaos in capitalism’s financial arrangements without 
flinching; and who, like Minsky, can imagine ways of surpassing this chaos when it 
bursts forth. De Long is one of several economists and commentators who have ac-
claimed a “Minsky moment” (John Cassidy 2008) and affirmed that “Minsky was 
right” (Martin Wolf 2008) about the endogenous occurrence of financial crises in 
capitalist economies. Yet Minsky’s policy prescriptions for resolving such crises 
have largely failed. How can this late economist’s words be simultaneously prophetic 
and insufficient? 
To understand this further paradox, we must carefully examine contrarian De 
Long’s comments: for while they contain the seeds of rebellion against New Classi-
cal economics, they also conform with the broader arc of mainstream thinking. De 
Long wants to widen it; but as it exists now, this arc of conformity rules Minsky’s 
way of thinking about financial and macroeconomic dynamics out of bounds. Min-
sky’s analytical frame was developed at a time when the US macroeconomic policy 
interventions reflected the confidence and reach (if also the self-absorption and arro-
gance) of the world’s hegemon. The frame is now so unimaginable for mainstream 
practitioners that they can absorb only small fragments (indeed, “moments”) of his 
ideas.  
 
2. Why has Minsky’s Solution not been Used to Resolve the 
Crisis of Minsky’s Moment? 
 
Minsky (1986) is famous for many reasons in the tribe of economists, one being his 
knack for capturing key ideas in apt phrases. Among the most celebrated of these 
phrases are “stability is destabilizing” and “big government”. Jan Kregel (2008) later 
added “big bank” to this list. The “destabilizing” idea implies that any tranquil state 
of steady growth in capitalism will be undermined as competition in the capitalist 
accumulation process leads firms and financial funds to build their debt-financed 
asset positions until they exceed a breaking point. At that point, Minsky assured us 
that “big bank” – lender of last resort intervention (that is, limitless liquidity provi-
sion as needed) – would stabilize the financial markets and banks. Then “big gov-
ernment” – counter-cyclical government expenditure, including safety-net and in-
vestment-related spending – would stabilize the real sector.   
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This was the basis of Minsky’s assurances that despite the susceptibility of 
economies with complex financial systems to financial instability, capitalist dynam-
ics could be tamed. And while Federal Reserve Board members and economists had 
scarcely acknowledged Minsky’s ideas, their reactions when business-cycle down-
turns threatened financial disorder largely followed his “big bank/big government” 
game plan. And among academic economists, Minsky’s warnings about capitalism’s 
inherent volatility due to out-of-control financial dynamics were almost universally 
ignored. 
The 2007-2008 financial meltdown changed all that. As economists belated 
discovered his ideas, Minsky became a household name, and the “Minsky moment,” 
a Wikipedia entry. It seemed initially that Minsky’s crisis-period policy prescriptions 
would work: many countries in the world economy returned to positive economic 
growth rates at the end of 2009, after six recession quarters. However, recovery 
stalled. While a 1930s-style debt-deflation was avoided, public interventions did not 
regenerate confidence or reduce uncertainty. At the macro level, the very counter-
cyclical actions that government took to offset declining aggregate demand created 
public-debt-to-income levels that undercut financial-sector “confidence.” At the mi-
cro level, most banks’ net income flows have recovered, but lending has not, block-
ing access to the credit flows on which small businesses depend. Larger non-
financial enterprises with their own access to direct credit markets, for their part, are 
generally sitting on cash reserves rather than investing. 
This contemporary policy debate centers on whether the fiscal stimulus and 
monetary policy steps undertaken in global North nations have been sufficient, and 
should be rekindled. On one side, James K. Galbraith and Dean Baker, among others, 
urge more aggressive Keynesian stimulus efforts, arguing that the initial stimulus 
was too timid; it appeased Wall Street and conservative political interests but did not 
overcome the economy’s deep displacement and malaise. Others urged caution; as 
World Bank President Robert Zoellick (2009) has put it, Milton Friedman should be 
remembered along with John Maynard Keynes, for the money has to go somewhere. 
This notion that an unpayable financial bill confronts nation states has ripened, with 
time, into a conscious UK policy of government downsizing, and into a full-fledged 
attack by conservative US leaders on the foundations of the welfare state.  
Attempts to split the difference between these views – such as Wolf’s argu-
ments that we need fiscal restraint, but not yet (for example, Wolf 2011) – have pro-
vided no rallying point for compromise. Debate has shifted from the size of any 
stimulus to controversy over the very size and purposes of government. Meanwhile, 
the Southern members of the Eurozone bind themselves into ever tighter contrac-
tions; and political leaders elsewhere offer sacrifices to the gods of fiscal restraint, 
hoping that the angel of financial-market panic will pass over without marking their 
doors. 
 
3. From the Keynesian-Monetarist Divide to the New-Keynesian 
“Truce” 
 
Some part of the ongoing financial-market panic is self-sustaining. As Markus K. 
Brunnermeier and Stefan Nagel (2004) have shown, price volatility spurred by eco-
nomic “news” provides market opportunities for bubble-riding speculators. Market  
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gyrations provide red earnings meat for the take-no-prisoners world of financial 
speculators whose appetites became enlarged due to overgorging in the subprime 
years.  
The increasing polarization of public commentary – the source of much of this 
“news” – has been paralleled by the sharp disagreements among economists at pres-
tigious departments, noted above. This end of polite discourse in economics may 
signal the end of the uneasy two-decade truce over macroeconomic policy. Whether 
it does is critically important: for the uneasy consensus reached under this truce pre-
cludes the sort of macroeconomic vision that Minsky’s work embodies. 
What consensus is there among protagonists who have fundamental disagree-
ments about the roles of government and markets in organizing contemporary social 
life? And why does it rule out the broader visions of Minsky or of (in De Long’s 
words) other “old-fashioned” macroeconomists?  
The Keynesian-Monetarist debate over macroeconomic policy dominated pol-
icy discourse from the 1950s through the middle-1970s. It centered on whether fiscal 
or monetary policy was more effective in stabilizing economic outcomes, and on the 
efficacy of demand stimulus. Those economists who advocated Keynesian macro-
policies but subscribed to the broader flow of Walrasian or neo-Walrasian theory – 
based as it is on “invisible hand” theorems – had to explain how equilibrium-
generating market forces coexisted with the need for activist macro-policy. James 
Tobin put it as follows: “The economy is in perpetual sectoral disequilibrium even 
when it has settled into a stochastic macro-equilibrium.” (Tobin 1972, p. 11). To 
maintain their bona-fides as mainstream practitioners , all the leading proponents of 
Keynesian policy intervention (Paul Samuelson, Tobin, Alan Blinder, among others) 
had to walk an ambiguous analytical line of the sort that Tobin’s phrase indicates.   
This purposeful ambiguity provided the opening for innovators such as Robert 
E. Lucas and Robert Barro to introduce equilibrium concepts appealing to microeffi-
ciency and to economic rationality into the heart of macroeconomic theory. These 
New Classicals subjected the Keynesians’ analytically-convenient or empirically-
pragmatic assumptions to withering questioning. Further, their critiques received 
steadily growing empirical support, as Keynesian macroeconometric models cali-
brated on 1950s/1960s data misbehaved badly in explaining 1970s and 1980s pat-
terns. 
The upshot was a forced consensus that activist macroeconomic policy was 
markedly less powerful in affecting market outcomes than mechanical Keynesian-
consensus models had asserted. This truce was always uneasy. When the New 
Classicals accused the Keynesian models of being ad hoc (adaptive, not rational ex-
pectations), a dilemma was posed: either admit that the market equilibrium was not 
the conceptual entry point for Keynesian insights or surrender all claims to having 
distinct policy claims.  
Initially, some Keynesians tried to avoid the terms of this dilemma by chal-
lenging New Classical economics on empirical grounds. An example will serve as an 
illustration. In a Brookings Panel paper, De Long and Lawrence H. Summers (1988) 
used extensive empirical analysis to argue that active macroeconomic policy has led 
to the more stable and positive rates of growth experienced by the US economy since  
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the Great Depression. Both commentators, while sympathetic to Keynesian ideas, 
found this argument unconvincing, largely because it was not linked to a model ex-
plaining the links from micro mechanisms to these outcomes. Gregory N. Mankiw 
(1988) noted dismissively that the authors had neither defined nor defended a spe-
cific hypothesis. Christina Romer wrote, “The authors seem content to say that since 
policy could have caused it, we should conclude that policy was effective. This ar-
gument, I'm afraid, will never convince anyone who does not already believe.” (Ro-
mer 1988, p. 85). 
In effect, the New Classicals had played an analytical trump card, which 
forced mainstream Keynesians to disown several generations of models built on a 
boot-strap basis using pragmatic “real world” assumptions. These Keynesians didn’t 
like the shift from a “reality-based” to a “model-based” analytical devices: but the 
price for fighting it – exclusion from the discipline’s commanding heights – was too 
high. Provisional Keynesian devices for rationalizing activist macroeconomic policy, 
such as Tobin’s assertion of “perpetual sectoral disequilibrium,” could not survive 
New Classicals’ insistence that economic assertions had to be based on analytical 
features of equilibrium environments. 
 
The Microfoundational Turn and the 1980 Minnesota Fed Conference 
 
The suddenness of this shift is documented dramatically in the proceedings of the 
1980 Minnesota Federal Reserve conference Models of Monetary Economics (John 
H. Kareken and Neil Wallace 1980). At the conference’s core were several New 
Classical papers that approached money and credit by considering what features of 
analytical transaction environments might make agents value and use them. Two li-
ons of Keynesian economics were asked to comment. Tobin reacted to Wallace’s 
chapter on fiat money in overlapping-generations models by observing that the “fiat 
store of value” in the model is called “money, but it bears little resemblance to the 
money … that economists and policymakers argue about.” He acidly asked, “Isn’t it 
slightly ridiculous to identify as money the asset that the typical agent of the model 
would hold for an average of 25 years...?” (Tobin 1980, pp. 83-84). Frank Hahn, in 
turn, objected in a similar spirit:  
 
“... there are some general questions you can ask yourself, such as, How does money 
ever come to be used? How do financial institutions come to be what they are? But I 
don’t believe that is even the best understanding strategy. And it is quite dangerous.”  
“The way I would like to proceed is slightly different. That is to start off with all the 
monetary institutions and ask, What would have to be the case if these institutions are 
to survive? Now that is not the same question of how something comes to be what it is; 
it is a question of how something remains what it is.” (Hahn 1980, p. 161). 
 
David Cass and Karl Shell (1980) defended the new approach by noting that it 
was “fundamentally dynamic” and “genuinely disaggregative” (Cass and Shell 1980, 
p. 253); indeed, these theorists position themselves against the “almost total agnosti-
cism implicit in the excessive demand characterizations pioneered by Hugo Sonnen-
schein” (ibid., p. 257).  
Cass and Shell’s reference here is to the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theo-
rem. As Abu Turab S. Rizvi (2005) explicates in an overview essay, this theorem  
292  Gary A. Dymski 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 3, pp. 285-308 
demonstrates that a wide range of functions can underlie a well-behaved excess-
demand function of the sort that undergirds aggregate equilibrium models of the 
economy. In effect, Sonnenschein’s “characterizations” break the link between mi-
croeconomic models of how actual agents (even in optimizing worlds) behave and 
interact, on one hand, and aggregate macroeconomic models, on the other. Ma-
croeconomists who want to work with, say, simplified intertemporal equilibrium rep-
resentations of aggregate economies are freed from any need to explain what micro-
processes could generate whatever outcomes they derive.  
Randall Wright, in a retrospective assessment two decades later, observed that 
“Models of Monetary Economies set the agenda and the terms of discussion for 
monetary economics over the next quarter century.” (Wright 2005, p. 2). This is true 
insofar as attention turned in monetary economics to the features of analytical worlds 
– that is, the specific deviations from Walrasian general equilibrium (WGE) that 
could explain the demand for money, the existence of loan markets, or for other fi-
nancial phenomena. WGE is an intellectual sink in neoclassical economic theory: the 
benchmark used to explain any institutions that appear in really-existing economies 
(Dymski 2011a). In a full-information world of costless transactions and pre-
coordination, no economic institutions would evidently be necessary. Thus explain-
ing anything from banks to secondary loan markets depends in this approach on 
specifying how optimizing agents might create such institutions in second-best 
worlds, as mechanisms for improving their welfare ex-post.  
Such explanations involve the construction of microfoundations – what indi-
vidual agents might do to optimize when information is imperfect and contracts are 
not self-enforcing. Their possible actions include the construction of institutions as 
mechanisms for reducing the impact of information problems on incentive compati-
bility, efficiency, and quality-control. So contrary to Hahn’s hopes, institutions are 
explained in terms of “how something comes to be what it is.”  
 
4. New Keynesian Economics and the Embrace of Mechanism-
Based Explanation 
 
New Keynesian Economics represents an efficient solution to the dilemma posed for 
mainstream Keynesians by the rise of New Classical economics. Its proponents’ core 
strategy for defending government policy interventions or arrangements (such as 
long-term wage contracts) that deviate from WGE optima was to explain these phe-
nomena as second-best responses to one or another informational or transaction-cost 
problem. 
Focusing on the microfoundational implications of small deviations from 
competitive market equilibria permitted Keynesians to share the same entry point as 
their New Classical critics. When this entry point was accompanied by strong as-
sumptions about market equilibration, the New Classical theoretical conclusion – 
forcefully shown by Lucas (1987) – that government policy could have no systematic 
– and certainly no welfare-improving – effect on aggregate output and employment 
was unrefutable. What remained possible given this entry point was to demonstrate 
that simple informational or transactions-cost deviations from the conditions required  
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for first-best equilibrium outcomes could alter optimizing behavior and the play of 
market forces, opening the possibility of policy actions and institutional develop-
ments that could improve on autonomous market equilibria.  
This solution admitted the ascendancy of efficient-market proponents, who re-
affirmed the core idea that resource exchange guided solely by decentralized markets 
can in principal achieve socially optimal allocations. As the turbulent early 1980s 
gave way to the years of the “great moderation” in business cycles, this seemed a 
small price to pay. For two decades, it seemed that macroeconomic policy, tamed of 
its former Keynesian ambitions, was delivering smoothly reliable growth – at least, 
in global-North nations. And meanwhile a modest venue for policy activism was re-
tained: the creation or fine-tuning of market structures that reduce losses from infor-
mational problems or transaction costs.  
So while this forced “truce” required that active fiscal policy be largely dis-
avowed, policy activism did not disappear: it was transformed. Many policy experi-
ments were undertaken; these ranged from the creation of bi- and multi-lateral trad-
ing consortia to investment treaties to the creation of the Eurozone. These did not 
draw the wrath of the New Classicals who had captured high macroeconomic theory. 
For one thing, these policy experiments represented a clear shift away from efforts to 
affect output and employment levels by managing aggregate demand. For another, as 
explored below, many key policy experiments in these years conformed closely with 
the Walrasian premises of the New Classical model itself. As such, these policy ex-
periments extended the reach and scope of the logic of New Classical Economics 
well beyond the notion of using simple fixed rules to manage macroeconomies.  
 
A Strategic Role for Game-Theoretic Models 
 
The reshaping of policy activism by economists who remained mainstream practitio-
ners was facilitated by the increasing use of game theory as an analytical language in 
economics. Game theory provided analytically tractable ways of understanding how 
markets, left to their own devices, could malfunction. A key distinction was made 
between principals – those who control scarce resources and who must hire the ser-
vices of others to fully exploit the income-generating potential of those resources – 
and agents – those who lack resources and instead survive by selling their labor ser-
vices to others.  
Fundamental analytical work on the economics of incomplete markets had re-
vealed that autonomous market forces would not achieve determinate, optimal out-
comes when agents held informational advantages over principals. To the contrary: if 
principals could not accurately read agent intentions, or differentiate competent from 
incompetent agents, then using price signals to select among agents is likely to lead 
to resource misallocation. And markets malfunction primarily because agents can use 
their informational advantages to cheat or mislead principals.  
The notion of informational problems as the root problem of market dysfunc-
tionality was immensely attractive to economists, for several reasons. First, the pub-
lication of the paradigm-shaping papers of this theoretical approach coincided with 
the rise of the information age and of the network society (Manuel Castells 1996). 
Second, the fingers of blame are pointed at the resource-seeking economic units  
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(agents), not at resource-dispensing units (principals). Attention focused on micro-
economic coordination mechanisms, not on larger questions of the architecture of 
aggregate economic flows. While practitioners of other social sciences were engaged 
in conversations about the systemic foibles of neoliberalism and its “race to the bot-
tom”, economists’ attention narrowed to how agents had to adjust to a more competi-
tive global environment. Third, the tools in question were remarkably plastic – prin-
cipal-agent analyses were used to describe the moves and countermoves of nation-
states and bank lenders, of managers and boards of directors, and of villagers. Fourth, 
this focus appealed to many economists’ built-in bias toward believing that optimal 
means of distributing scarce resources can be found if the incentives are right. 
The maturation of game-theoretic models of asymmetric information provided 
a new terrain of exploration for this last bias. International economics, development 
economics, and industrial organization were all completely reinvented as fields of 
application for information-centered game theory. The terms “mechanisms” and 
“mechanism design” were adopted to explain the new approach to policy questions. 
Roger B. Myerson (2008) puts it as follows in his entry for the Palgrave Dictionary:  
 
“A mechanism is a specification of how economic decisions are determined as a func-
tion of the information that is known by the individuals in the economy. Mechanism 
theory shows that incentive constraints should be considered coequally with resource 
constraints in the formulation of the economic problem. … Mechanism design is the 
fundamental mathematical methodology for analysing economic efficiency subject to 
incentive constraints.” 
 
These definitions are purposely general. Our interest here is in the application 
of these methods to macro-scale crises. Two simultaneous financial crises at the 
dawn of the neoliberal era provided opportunities to apply these ideas: the Latin 
American debt crisis and the US savings-and-loan (thrift) crisis (Dymski 2011b, 
2011c). In both cases, analysis using asymmetric information centered on moral haz-
ard problems, not on adverse selection. In the Latin American debt crisis, the key 
problem was borrower countries’ lack of repayment effort. Money-center banks’ ex-
cessive portfolios of Latin American loans also was traced to inadequate controls by 
owners over risk-taking managers. In the thrift crisis, thrift management’s incentives 
to take on overly-risky projects was also the key issue. The depositors who provided 
most of thrifts’ loanable funds – and who were thus the principals, for whom thrift 
managers were working as agents – were protected by deposit insurance (and were 
thus risk-indifferent). Further, thrifts could choose their regulators, since they could 
charter themselves at the federal or state level. Mechanism designs were needed, 
then, to induce repayment, and to rein in managers. Insuring repayment meant creat-
ing sufficiently high penalties for non-payment. Thrift managers could be reined in 
by eliminating deposit insurance, eliminating “two-tier” thrift regulation, or making 
thrift managers more accountable to owners’ interests (this also applied to the man-
agers of megabanks with excessive lending in Latin America).  
Two features of these analyses bear emphasis here. First, a core assumption is 
that principals control a scarce resource: lenders, the supply of credit; depositors, 
loanable funds. In a proper mechanism design, those controlling scarce resources 
should have the ability to withhold them from agents; crisis arises precisely when  
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this control is lost. Second, when principal-agent relationships malfunction, restoring 
orderly outcomes means either imposing costs on, or providing incentives to, misper-
forming agents. Using Myerson’s terminology, agents’ incentive constraints compli-
cate the distribution of rewards and penalties based on resource ownership. Means 
must be found to neutralize the positional power that information asymmetry distrib-
utes to agents. While available mechanism designs are costly, these costs are far less 
than the zero-sum losses that principals would otherwise experience. 
These ideas about mechanism designs were applied asymmetrically to these 
two crises. Latin American borrower countries were in fact disciplined: austerity re-
gimes were imposed, financial systems were opened, import-controls weakened, and 
planning and development-finance agencies were eliminated. The US megabank and 
thrift crises were resolved quite differently. A few fraudulent bankers went to prison. 
But most of the large failing banks and thrifts were acquired by other, still larger 
banks – and the deregulation process continued. The Basel I agreements of Decem-
ber 1987 established capital-asset standards as guidelines for large banks. But no 
general effort to align risk-bearing with risk-taking was undertaken (Dymski 2011d). 
These resolutions illustrate four other important features of these applications 
of mechanism design. First, differences in nation-states’ power dictated the strictness 
of the terms for whatever mechanisms were used, as well as how strictly these ar-
rangements were policed: the more powerful a principal’s nation-state, the lighter 
and more voluntary the terms. Second, some mechanisms were imposed by force 
(IMF austerity packages), while others were voluntary, agreed among members of a 
club (Basel I). Third, the situations generating these crises involved multi-level 
(nested) principal-agent problems; but the complications to which these multi-level 
aspects gave rise were ignored. Fourth, spillover effects were completely ignored. 
There was no attention to whether austerity macroeconomic packages facilitating 
Latin American nations’ repayment of debt would impose collateral costs on these 
nation’s overall employment, wage, and growth levels – or, for that matter, on US or 
European growth rates. These mechanisms focused on enforcing the rights of re-
source owners – in effect, on protecting the economy’s supply side. Demand-side 
considerations were left out of the discussion. 
 
5. Neoliberal Mechanism Designs  
 
This brings us to neoliberal mechanism designs – that is, mechanism designs that 
respond to the specific conditions of the neoliberal era. Three conditions are espe-
cially important. First, this era has been characterized by increasingly unchecked 
corporate power, ranging from “race to the bottom” relocations of production facili-
ties to financial firms’ spectacular growth and adventurous risk-taking. Second, the 
neoliberal era has been characterized by the reduced power of national states vis-à-
vis market forces. Specifically, nation-states in the neoliberal era have been unable to 
establish rules for cross-border economic flows; they have had difficulty in stabiliz-
ing income and expenditure flows at levels insuring that residents within their bor-
ders have secure and broadly-prosperous lives; and they have been unable to support 
public services at levels that improve human welfare.   
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A third defining feature of the neoliberal era is the steady decline in the United 
States’ leadership. The US reshaped much of the world economy in its own image 
and for its own prosperity in the post-War period (Yanis Varoufakis 2011). In par-
ticular, the US-dollar-backed Bretton Woods system locked large areas of the world 
into a stable trading/exchange system and left very limited possibilities for financial 
speculation. The Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort capacities were unchal-
lenged. Over the ensuing decades, this hegemonic position gradually slipped. The 
neoliberal era has been at best a period of “post-hegemonic hegemony” (Dymski 
2002): the US dollar has remained the global currency of choice, but the US can no 
longer link the dollar to gold, maintain open Polanyian markets, or dictate global 
geo-political developments. Both nation-states and the firms and individuals within 
nation-states have had to adjust to the de-facto rules of an increasingly leaderless 
global system. 
In effect, the decline of models which assume governmental decisions can de-
finitively shape macroeconomic outcomes has paralleled events. The older Keynes-
ian policy activism that was attacked so efficiently by New Classical Economics in-
volved models in which the state, even when structurally constrained, has a clear 
field of policy action for affecting real outcomes. These sorts of models, which con-
stituted the core of the neo-Keynesian synthesis, were steadily undermined in the 
1970s and 1980s. These years saw reduced space for national regulation of financial 
markets, reduced union power, freer global movement of capital and credit, and the 
rise of new centers of national power. In the neoliberal age not even powerful nation-
states can make moves without considering counter-moves. Thus, beginning with 
models in which players mutually influence one another’s outcomes provides a 
grammar for the policy choices and constraints of nations under neoliberalism.  
 
Locational Arbitrage, Hedging, and Speculation 
 
While the neoliberal world lacks a hegemon of unchallenged strength, it remains 
comprised of stronger and weaker nations and regional zones. Economic resources 
broadly conceived - product markets, non-renewable resources, final-goods demand, 
and sources of capital and credit, to name only several – were all unevenly distrib-
uted across global economic space after the Bretton Woods system broke down: each 
resource was spatially-differentiated, with areas of plenty and scarcity. Players within 
this spatially-fragmented world order are stronger insofar as they control the use of, 
or access to, scarce resources that consistently command economic rents. However, 
the three most important categories of global players – nation-states, multi-national 
corporations, and financial intermediaries – have different impulses vis-à-vis this 
uneven map. These players’ dominant strategies involve the defense of fixed points 
of multi-dimensional resource concentration; leverage-based hedging and specula-
tion; and offensive strategies based on locational flexibility. We take these in reverse 
order. 
Nation-states with concentrations of multiple economic resources as defined 
above try to control access to their markets. Nation-states without them – in conjunc-
tion with “footloose” corporations – try to capture rents by accessing national mar-
kets with prosperous consumers. The latter strategies, facilitated by the Thatcher and 
Reagan “revolutions,” led to the rise of the global factory in the 1980s.   
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The neoclassical mechanism design favored by global corporations, in league 
with resource-poor (and low-wage) nation-states or regions, is one of generalized 
arbitrage. The original meaning of arbitrage was of the exploitation of implicit price 
differences that appeared momentarily at a point in time. The profit on the transac-
tions involved, which centered around spot-market financial transactions, was locked 
in instantly. So this arbitrage was riskless, and would occur if the return to the play 
exceeded the transaction cost. This no longer applies. Now, arbitrage takes place 
across time as well in space, in production as well as finance.  
In the evolving global terrain of split production and consumption opportuni-
ties, corporations’ former accumulation strategies – centered on longer-term invest-
ment in plant, capacity, and local supplier subsystems – became outmoded: through-
time commitments reduce flexibility in rapidly shifting playing fields. The strategic 
focus shifts to arbitrage, across many fronts: in effect, these players arbitrage ex-
change rates; they arbitrage workers’ wages; they arbitrage rates of return on finan-
cial instruments; and they value above all else the ability to unwind positions rapidly. 
Liquidity rules, always in search of price differentials that can be exploited across 
time and across space. 
These attack-based arbitrage strategies valorized as never before the problem 
of protecting the value of wealth assets. Suppose a factory is located in a lower-
income nation that has few tools for controlling the value of its currency or the sus-
tainability of its advantages as a production site; and suppose this factory sells goods 
to a resource-rich space whose residents have systematically high levels of income 
and wealth. On one hand, the corporation operating this factory needs to hedge its 
currency and product-line exposure. On the other, the residents of the privileged 
space to which this factory sells will have an ever-more-profound need to protect the 
value of their previously accumulated wealth. In effect, the more low-wage global 
factories cut into the production levels of resource-rich spaces, the more hedging 
demand there is. And just as arbitrage now operates two-dimensionally – through 
space and in time – hedging needs have become two-dimensional as well. A financial 
intermediary located in a resource-rich zone, for example, may value the ability to 
delink itself from credit contracts it has originated; and whichever financial interme-
diary buys those contracts may want down-side insurance.   
The increased value assigned to hedging creates new financial strategic possi-
bilities, which Minsky (1996) termed “money-market capitalism” in his later work. 
On one hand, any nation-state with a stable, reliable financial system for storing, re-
taining, investing, and risking wealth can achieve gains in jobs and wealth, insofar as 
its large financial intermediaries are able to meet the increased demand for hedging. 
These gains will be multiplied if this hedging is accompanied by zero-sum risk-
taking by asset-owners willing to take bets on states of the world. These gains will be 
multiplied still further insofar as the players taking state-of-the-world bets linked to 
hedging markets are able to leverage their asset positions by accessing low-cost li-
quidity markets. And as noted above, heightened volatility in prices or in relation-
ships among nation-states is good for business: it generates more hedging demand 
and provides more fuel for zero-sum bets (provided, of course, that this position-
taking does not undercut the stability of the financial system). 
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Defending Fixed-Points of Concentrated Resources in a Post-Hegemonic World 
   
Ranged against these attack- and speculation-based strategies are nation-states and 
firms that seek to defend fixed-points of concentrated resources. Building these de-
fenses involves solving nested principal-agent problems. For example, a central bank 
is at the apex of a national financial system. Suppose for simplicity that its motiva-
tion is to insure that the banks in this system make productive loans, whose volume 
does not create excessive inflationary pressure. As Charles A. Goodhart (1988) 
points out, the mechanism design problem here is that each bank has an incentive to 
lend more than its proportional share. If the banking system is run as a “club” – with 
one bank elected as the “central bank” by other members – the banking system will 
be subject to failure due to “free rider” problems. The only stable solution is to give 
the central bank the authority to punish member banks that lend excessively. That is, 
a “club” which members are free to leave will eventually fail: either it will fall prey 
to “free riding,” or its members will resign when its central-bank attempts to impose 
discipline.  
The problem for “clubs” is then enforceability. In the absence of this, club 
members will maintain exit options that protect their right to withdraw. This is, more 
broadly, the principal flaw of mechanism designs that seek to protect resource-rich 
spaces in a post-hegemonic world: there is no one player that can enforce rules and 
prohibit defections. There is, in the end, no one nation-state strong enough to make 
and enforce rules that all other players must follow. As a consequence, everyone-for-
herself behavior becomes pervasive.  
The US in the 1950s and 1960s had the capacity to maintain discipline in trad-
ing rules and in financial exchanges, and it expanded its influence via macroeco-
nomic policies and special arrangements (the Marshall Plan) which increased pur-
chasing power outside the boundaries of the US. The conditions permitting this – 
including the Cold War – have all but disappeared. One signal is the failure of the 
Doha Round of the World Trade Organization. But an equally profound signal was 
the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992.  
 
6. NAFTA and the EU as Neoliberal Mechanism Designs 
 
NAFTA is a quintessential neoliberal mechanism design. Its premises are entirely 
neoliberal: the participant countries (the US, Mexico, Canada) exist in a world of 
mobile capital and corporations; and all three nations have limited capacity to main-
tain stable and prosperous macroeconomies autonomously. NAFTA’s “free trade” 
(zero tariff) clause created an incentive for the mobile corporations that are either 
based in the US or that trade to the US, to locate production facilities in Mexico, 
which is a low-wage hub (Robert A. Blecker 2003). NAFTA also required a uniform 
tariff and required member nations to disassemble all investment and trade rules that 
are more protective or stricter than in any other member nation. These clauses cre-
ated a protected supra-national zone, with the purpose of providing Mexican, Ameri-
can, and Canadian companies and consumers with “club-member” advantages. 
Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of jobs were lost in the US (Robert E. Scott 
2003).   
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Overall, NAFTA has been a modified failure. Lost US jobs and wages served 
as a demonstration effect to prove the desirability of the NAFTA zone as a place to 
invest and build factories, especially in Mexico, with its lower wage levels. But the 
new Mexican jobs did not survive long. Further, NAFTA’s mandate that all three 
nations agree on a common environmental policy did not succeed; nor did NAFTA 
mitigate undocumented Mexican workers’ migration to the US (Gary C. Hufbauer 
and Jeffrey J. Schott 2005). The key problem was that the agreement lacked enforce-
ability; each partner lacked the capacity to impose penalties that would induce the 
others to comply. It was, in the end, a club. No super-level authority was established 
to impose mandates on NAFTA’s member states. No thought was given to the possi-
bility of spillover losses (such as the loss of aggregate demand in the US economy 
from lost jobs replaced by lower-wage jobs in Mexico). And finally, no authority 
existed that could block nation-states elsewhere in the world (notably China) from 
negotiating trade/manufacturing deals that offered higher profits to multinational 
corporations that relocated from Mexico’s maquiladora district. The US government 
no longer had sufficient hegemonic power to block Chinese manufacturing districts 
form outcompeting Mexico; and in any event, several successive US Presidential 
administrations sided with multinational companies and banks against US workers. 
And in the end, the failure of NAFTA to deliver on its economic promises, and to 
provide “safety net” support for redundant workers, has been one factor in the crisis 
of political legitimacy in the US and in Mexico. 
Returning briefly to the 1980s Latin American crisis, note that the key mecha-
nism design that emerged in response to that crisis, the Basel I agreement on bank-
capital adequacy, had shortcomings similar to those of NAFTA. Basel I was an 
agreement among members of a club; no super-regulator existed that could punish 
excessively risky banks. Indeed, members of the club had incentives to bend the rules 
– to “free ride” – for their own advantage. Furthermore, this agreement did not block 
the emergence of unregulated competitors (hedge funds, private-equity funds, and so 
on) that could undercut Basel’s purpose of controlling global financial risks. Basel II, 
whose implementation was not in place prior to the 2008 crisis, resolved none of 
these problems: to the contrary, it relied more heavily on self-monitoring by the 
megabanks it was established to police.  
This brings us to the European Union (EU) and the Eurozone dilemma. Like 
NAFTA, the EU can be understood as a mechanism for attracting scarce capital. As 
an economic union, the core premise of the EU was to use a common currency (the 
Euro) to generate a large domestic market, encouraging investment and economic 
development throughout the Eurozone. And like NAFTA, the EU aspired to equal-
ized tariff levels and investment rules. However, the EU’s intention went dramati-
cally beyond that of NAFTA, encompassing a broader project of European citizen 
rights and political union. The Euro was introduced by 17 of the 27 member states of 
the European Union on January 1, 1999. The agreed outlines of this broader project 
were embodied in the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed by EU member states on 
December 13, 2007. The problem of achieving ratification of a broader European 
political union, however, remains unsolved. 
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The EU’s economic mechanisms have all the flaws mentioned for NAFTA 
and Basel. The EU is a club – or, in the phrase of Galbraith (2011), a confederation. 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty established various parameters for its members’ macro-
economic ratios (price inflation and debt/GDP), with the idea of encouraging conver-
gence prior to the launching of the common currency. Limits on participating na-
tions’ budgetary excesses were supposed to harmonize national growth rates. These 
rules guarded against fiscal “free riding” by member states; they also largely pre-
cluded Keynesian macroeconomic stimulus packages. The idea was that a disciplined 
Eurozone could achieve convergence via both the increased mobility of capital and 
investment and the proper management of national fiscal policy. Member states re-
mained responsible for regulating their nationally-chartered banks, though under 
rules that provided for tit-for-tat deregulation of financial activity. The program of 
EU-wide financial deregulation aimed at opening up European nations’ notoriously 
closed financial markets and, as with NAFTA, attracting global capital and building 
up Europe as a financial center. 
These guidelines were put in place, and the Euro launched, with no clear pun-
ishments available in the case of non-compliance, and no super-authority to enforce 
the rules. The European Central Bank occupied the space of a central economic au-
thority and insurer, but lacked the mandate and powers of national central banks. 
Further, no mechanism for fiscal transfers was put in place, apart from the encour-
agement of cross-border investment and the creation of a European Investment Bank 
(with provisions against moral hazard and “free riding” duly included in its charter). 
The idea was that in the short run, less robust economies such as Greece would de-
pend on stimuli (investment, tourism, and so on) from stronger zone economies such 
as Germany. In the longer run, all nations should conform to the German example 
and develop export-led growth strategies.  
As large portions of the Eurozone have come under pressure from declining 
revenues, escalating bad debts, and shrinking national incomes, the absence of a true 
European central bank and of any mechanism for emergency fiscal transfers has cre-
ated all-but-untenable pressures on its weaker members. Relief is largely unavailable 
for Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland: for these nations (and soon others?), auster-
ity measures are the only available means of working out their problems. These 
measures will be hard to swallow, given the higher wages and “safety net” protec-
tions of residents in stronger EU economies.  
This flawed and fragile design makes all members of the Union aware of the 
possibility of failure, and explains the reluctance of the stronger-economy members 
to agree to European bonds that will be the responsibility of a fiscal union that may 
soon no longer exist. Recent proposals to make the European Central Bank the de-
factor ministry of finance for Euro-zone member nations (Andrew Davis 2011), or to 
provide emergency fiscal resources to austerity-stricken member countries in ex-
change for guarantees of future fiscal prudence (Peter Spiegel 2011) only demon-
strate the impossibility of maintaining a unified economic area without uniform po-
litical inclusion.  
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7. Limits of Policy Intervention in a World of Neoliberal 
Mechanism Designs  
   
With the arrival of the neoliberal era and the defeat of Keynesian-consensus macro-
economics, a shift from “big government/big bank” solutions to more narrow policy 
approaches was all but inevitable. The maturation of information-intensive game 
theory provided the necessary intellectual basis. The resulting neoliberal mechanisms 
– which were aimed at either protecting resource-rich areas, gaining access to such 
areas, or hedging (and speculating on) risk differentials – provided provisional 
strategies in an increasingly leaderless world.  
Prior to the current period of extended crisis, these devices offered gains for 
some portions of the populations of participating nations. However, they created an 
unstable map of global “winners” and “losers,” and very limited options for nations 
seeking more prosperity for their citizens. A weak player that seeks access to re-
sources or markets can win only by being the low-cost bidder, competing thereafter 
with other low-cost bidders. A nation that wants bi-lateral trade arrangements or en-
try to a supra-national club (and its markets and resources), must open up its own 
markets. Stronger players in these clubs can demand concessions and break the rules 
with (relative) impunity. And all club members cooperate tentatively, preserving 
their escape options.  
These mechanisms are not sustainable on their own terms. For one thing, gen-
eralized arbitrage strategies only work because of supports offered by non-neoliberal 
state supports. The mobility of production – the global factory – depends on the abil-
ity of states in off-shore labor-suppliers to provide for their population’s needs and 
security. Arbitrage through time in financial markets depends on the availability of 
deep, liquid markets. More generally, permitting self-interested players to use un-
regulated, hyper-optimized market mechanisms to extract short-term gains without 
considering the long-term sustainability of the economic units with whom they are 
trading is social suicide. For another thing, neoliberal mechanism designs are self-
undermining. Global firms’ “regulatory arbitrage” and “bottom-feeding” games are 
premised precisely on their freedom to recontract and move away. Nations can off-
load some risks and costs onto the external environment; but this only delays the day 
of reckoning. 
Further, the limits to these devices have been exposed in the current global 
crisis, as noted above: asymmetries in national economic power among participants 
in these mechanisms; “club” arrangements without enforceability provisions; multi-
level principal-agent relationships whose complications are not addressed; and inat-
tention to spillovers. The possible breakup of the European Union is the most dra-
matic case, because it is the most ambitious of the neoliberal mechanism designs. But 
NAFTA has brought only economic stagnation and governmental near-collapse to 
Mexico; and the Basel mechanism for bank regulation is completely adrift. 
 
Unforgetting the Macrofoundations of the Neoliberal Crisis 
 
This paper began by recounting some paradoxes of the global crisis: weak recovery 
without job growth; a profit surge without an investment surge; a global crisis with  
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debates and action only at subglobal levels; and a failure to recognize that only pre-
neoliberal policies (safety-net, government guidance) have softened the blow. These 
paradoxes derived in part from governments’ hesitant use of policy measures in the 
2008-09 round of the crisis. Contrary to the New Classical prescription that nothing 
could (or should) be done, governments acted: they used temporary fiscal stimuli to 
stabilize (some) households’ cash-flows; and they subsidized core financial institu-
tions, promising to regulate them properly. But these initiatives came to little. The 
fiscal stimuli are now exhausted: stronger and more fully-recovered economies are 
unwilling to share their gains, and the weak cannot force action. And megabanks ac-
cepted their public bailouts without thanks; they continue to regard their ability to 
take unchecked zero-sum risks as a natural feature of economic globalization. And 
while some financial excesses have been reined in, the architecture of financial regu-
lation remains fragmented and subject to manipulation and blackmail.  
Now a global downturn threatens again, and policy-makers’ willingness to 
bend the neoliberal rules regarding fiscal stimulus is far less than three years ago. 
Apparently, “big government” did not work. There is no meaningful discussion about 
how countries without safety nets can create them now. Instead, government aid has 
been used to support positionally-powerful corporate sectors (US, German autos) or 
to underwrite insolvent financial firms/sectors. In the US, elected officials call for 
reduced government spending levels; in Europe, national leaders announce large-
scale budget cuts.  
So what beckons instead is deepened use of available neoliberal mechanisms. 
Those countries that remain resource-rich (as defined above) again worry about pro-
tecting what they have; those who are resource-poor again try to arbitrage income 
flows; and financial funds and speculators seek new markets to conquer. These 
mechanisms will generate some success for some players; but they are largely zero-
sum: the available tools are designed to capture and hold some portion of a set of 
economic transactions that will otherwise be undertaken elsewhere. That is, nations 
seeking to “win” will turn back to the very neoliberal mechanism designs – macro 
(Euro-zone, NAFTA) and micro (financial arbitrage and speculation) – that gener-
ated crisis in the first place. But if no alternative is on offer, the logic of contraction 
and zero-sum revenue-extraction will be inexorable; the paradoxes of the crisis will 
multiply. 
Addressing these paradoxes will require a radical shift for those who wish to 
use government action to address the global crisis. The shift from macroeconomic 
policy stimulus to New Keynesian mechanism designs has to be reversed. Many 
well-intentioned analysts are working on the wrong thing for the wrong reasons. It is 
impossible to find ways to make the EU or NAFTA work – or work better – while 
accepting the premises of neoliberal policy intervention. The first step in rethinking 
failed neoliberal mechanism designs is to overturn the limits imposed on policy in-
tervention in the neoliberal world. It makes sense to think of a European political 
project that leads to broad-based and shared economic prosperity from the Mediter-
ranean to the Baltic Sea; it makes sense to think of a prosperous and more fully inte-
grated North America. But either project, European Union or NAFTA, must be re-
thought as something other than a neoliberal design.   
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And economists engaged in this rethinking must throw off the self-imposed 
constraints of thinking of truly macroeconomic problems only within the neoclassical 
sink. Keynes’ bold step of identifying Say’s Law as the key constraint blocking the 
imagination of the neoclassical economists of his day must be renewed in our day. 
From a Keynesian perspective, neoliberal mechanism designs all have a common 
flaw: they never problematize the adequacy of aggregate demand, considered on its 
own. So mechanisms for aggregate-demand generation are outside the frame; only 
mechanisms for more efficient allocation of resources already assumed to have mar-
kets are imaginable in neoliberal worlds. The first step in destroying this world and 
its contractionary, zero-sum logic is to recognize that macroeconomics must be freed 
from the neoclassical sink – the magnetic pull of the WGE as the only authentic point 
of reference for serious economic discourse.   
   
8. Conclusion 
 
The quote by Stephens of the Financial Times placed at the beginning of this essay 
sees a world of centripetal and centrifugal forces, in which the global hegemon, the 
US, is rendered incapable of action, caught up in conflict with emerging global-South 
powers. The temptation to see events through nationalist-rivalry eyes is indeed be-
coming overwhelming. Zero-sum contests have losers, and losers’ resentments, if 
multiplied, are eventually harvested.  
But what Stephens attributes to great-powers-rivalry has another root: the shift 
of perspective within economics from an open embrace of large-scale Keynesian pol-
icy activism, to compliance with New Classical economics’ macro-policy pessimism. 
As we have seen, New Keynesian economics opted out of this dead-end by defining 
a new terrain for policy activism: the creation of mechanism designs for improving 
income flows and welfare through more efficient use of available economic re-
sources. The limits of this compromise were not so evident during the years of the 
Great Moderation, during which the US’s current-account deficit provided a seem-
ingly endless source of spillover-demand generation. But that epoch was ended by 
the subprime crisis, and now avoiding global stagnation or depression requires some-
thing more: members of the economics profession who are not afraid to argue for 
(and conduct research regarding) large-scale macroeconomic policy initiatives as the 
only means of overcoming the systemic consequences of a world of neoliberal 
mechanism designs. 
In the current global crisis, Keynesian stimulus is needed, long-term invest-
ment is needed, growth with equality is needed. A public spending initiative that 
serves as a spillover generator, seeding renewed confidence and investment through-
out the global North, is badly needed. But the ability of government authorities in 
virtually every nation is blocked or undermined in advance. The world economy has 
been cluttered, over the past 30 years, with neoliberal mechanisms that reinforce the 
prerogatives of mobile, partially regulated capital. And financial capital, even in its 
weakened post-crisis state, feels empowered to sit in judgment of governmental fiscal 
discipline and credibility. That governments without fiscal and monetary discipline 
should – and will – be punished by mobile capital and dog-eat-dog trade regimes is 
completely naturalized, for it is evident to all players that the gains to be had in the  
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world of neoliberal mechanism designs are zero-sum. This lesson has been so deeply 
understood by policy-makers that the IMF no longer has to wield its orthodox-policy 
stick. Governments have internalized the IMF’s perspective.  
So where, from here? We have traced out the parallels between the coming of 
the neoliberal world and the turn of New Keynesian economists toward a preoccupa-
tion with mechanism design. This was the space for policy intervention that remained 
after New Classicals captured the realm of activist macroeconomic policy. Thus con-
signed to microfoundational realms, many New Keynesian interventions have fo-
cused on how principals and agents can defuse problems of incentive incompatibility 
and reach better second-best equilibria. 
What New Keynesians have not done is to challenge the narrow confines 
within which this theorizing about policy activism unfolds: in particular, their models 
do not conceptualize aggregate demand as an autonomous element in economic out-
comes. To do this will require overcoming the need to walk the analytical line be-
tween New Classical policy irrelevance and asymmetric-information based models. 
Taking this step means ending the three-decade-long macroeconomic “truce.” De 
Long has shown the way by openly declaring his skepticism of New Classical and 
efficient-market approaches. Whether this will lead to a renewal of truly Keynesian 
ideas among macroeconomists is not clear at this juncture – though a depression can 
change many things. Nor is it clear whether even Keynesian thinking as bold as Min-
sky’s can once again (as in the 1930s) rescue capitalism from its own excesses and 
limitations. But it is certain that the world of neoliberal mechanism designs, if not 
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Source: NIPA Tables, Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
 
 
Figure 1 Profits and Net Interest as a Share of National Income, Plus Growth Rate of Real GDP, 





Source: NIPA Tables, Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
 
 
Figure 2  Index of Net Real Investment Spending by Category, 2005=100, United States, 1999-2010 
(Annual Data)  